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MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION IN THE EMS: 
A V AR APPROACH 
José García Montalvo and Etsuro Shioji 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes monetary policy transmission in the European Monetary System using 
V  AR techniques.  After a discussion of  several V  AR identification procedures for the stance of 
monetary policy, this paper proposes an identification scheme that is essentially consistent with 
the basic facts  and  does not have significant puzzles.  The strategy is based on extracting the 
stance of monetary policy from the German system and using that structural shock in the V  AR 
systems of other countries ofthe EMS.  The results show that the stronger the commitment with 
the EMS discipline, the stronger the effect ofthe German monetary policy on the monetary policy 
of other EMS countries and the weaker the effect on the exchange rates. 
KEY WORDS: Monetary policy transmission, structural V  AR. 
RESUMEN 
El documento analiza la transmisión de la política monetaria en el  Sistema Monetario 
Europea usando  técnicas  de  V  AR  (Vectores  Autorregresivos).  Tras  discutir  sobre  varios 
procedimientos de V  AR para la identificación de la situación de la política monetaria, se propone 
un esquema de identificación, el cual es esencialmente consítente con los hechos económicos. La 
estrategia está basada en extraer la situación de la política monetaria del sistema alemán y utilizar 
el "shock" estructural en los sistemas V  AR de otros países del 5MB. Los resultados demuestran 
que  a mayor compromiso  con  la  disciplina  del  5MB,  más  fuerte  es  el  efecto de la  política 
monetaria alemana en la política monetaria de otros países del 5MB y más  débil el efecto sobre 
los tipos de cambio. 
P  ALABRAS CLAVE: Transmisión de política monetaria, Vectores autorregresivos estructurales. 
3 1  Introduction. 
Dne of the main arguments that has justified the entrance of many countries 
in the EMS mechanism is the credibility transmission of inflation fighter from 
the Bundesbank to the central banks of the countries that take part in  the 
system. What is the channel of transmission of such a credibility? The main 
channel is  the transmission of monetary policy from Germany to the rest of 
the system together with a "quasi-fixed" exchange rate.  Dne of the questions 
that this paper addresses is  how  Germ~n monetary policy affects monetary 
policy in other countries  of  the EMS.  Theoretical1y,  if exchange rates  are 
fixed there is no possibility for autonomous monetary policy from the rest of 
the countries.  However, the EMS  is  not a fixed  exchange rates mechanism 
and therefore,  there is  scope for  monetary independence in  the context of 
its exchange rate bands (Svensson 1994).  Another interesting question that 
we want to address is the extent of that "independence".  How far away can 
monetary policy of a country in the EMS be from German monetary policy? 
In order to address those questions we  adopt as  basic methodology the 
structural VAR approach.  This  is  the natural choice  given  that most  of 
the recent discussions on monetary policy identification and transmission are 
driven by that methodological approach.  Section 2 supplies a discussion of 
the VAR and identification in  general.  Section  3  presents  a  summary of 
the main results of the application oí VAR to the identification  of mone-
tary policy.  Section 4 disc.usses  some of the results for  the case of interac-
tion among different economies.  Section 5 proposes an identification squeme 
for  the transmission of monetary polic.y  in the EMS with two  applic.ations: 
groups of countries in the system and Spain before and after the entrance in 
the EMS.  Section 6 ineludes the main conclusions. 
5 2  The identification of monetary policy. 
2.1  The VAR methodology. 
Do  only innovations matter or anticipated monetary policy should be also 
considered?  And if only innovations  matter, How  can  we  measure them? 
Most  of the literature on  the effects  of monetary poliey  answers  to these 
questions by using the VAR methodology 1.  This section covers sorne of the 
relevant issues when applying that methodology to the analysis of monetary 
policy effects  2. 
Let  Yt  be a vector (n xl).  The specification of Yt  is  a pth-order autore-
gressive process 
Yt  =  a +  <I>¡Yt-l +  <I>zYt-Z +  ... +  +<I>pYt-p +  tt 
1>( L) YI  =  Et  (1 ) 
where the perturbation is ¡id.  and has a distribution function tt  f"V  N(O, D) 
and  1>(L)  =  Ao - 2:::;;"=1  AkLk.  Several questions arise when using the VAR 
methodology like the length of the lags (p), the type of deterministie compo-
nents, the transformation of the data, the estimation procedure, etc. We are 
going  to concentrate only on  those issues  that are significant for  the appli-
cation of this technique to the analysis of monetary policy.  These issues are 
essentially related to the variables that should be included in  the Yt  vector, 
the proper identification of monetary policy and the orthogonalization proce-
dure needed to separate exogenous economic policy shocks from endogenous 
effects. 
U  sers of VAR models do not report regularly the coefficient estimates or 
standard deviations of unrestricted VAR models given that, in general, the 
degrees of freedom left are small and high col1inearity give imprecise estimates 
1 An  alternative line of research  has used  the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
model (DSGE) to analyze the effects oí monetary policy using simulation and estimation. 
For this approach see Kim (1996), Cho and Cooley (1995),  Leeper  and Sims (1994), Yun 
(1994) or Cooley and Hansen  (1995). 
2For  a general vision of VAR see Watson (1995), Canova (1995) or Hamilton (1994). 
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of short run relationships.  The tools more often used to present the results 
of this kind of models  are the  impulse-response fundíon and the variance 
decomposition.  However, these exercises are meaningless if the model is not 
identified,  in  the sense  of having  VAR  innovations  being orthogonal  and 
having a clear economic interpretation. This process is similar to the recovery 
of structural parameters from a reduced form estimation. In the case of the 
VAR the reduced form express  ion is 
Yt  =  <I>lYt-1 +  <I>zYt-Z +  ... +  <I>pYt-p +  tt 
and the structural form would be 
AoYt = A1Yt-l +  A2Yt-2 +  ... +  ApYt-p +  Ut 
(2) 
(3) 
In general the identification problem appea.rs because we need to recover 
the structural parameters, or innovations, from the reduced-form model. 
•  In the reduced form model the number of parameter to be estimated 
are n2p + n(n + 1)/2 corresponding  to the matrices  <I>1'  <I>2, ... ,  <I>p,~!) 
where n is  the number of elements in the Yt  vector. 
•  In the strnctural model  there are n2(p +  1) + n(n +  1)/2 parameters 
corresponding to the matri  ces  Ao, Al, ... Ap,  ~1L' 
There is an obvious relationship between the reduced form and the struc-
tural one.  We could rewrite the structural form as 
Yt  =  A01 A1Yt-1 +  Aü
1 A2Yt-2 +  ... +  Aü1ApYt_p +  Aü1Ut  (4) 
which irnplies that 
<I>1  =  Ao1A1 
<I>2  A01A2 
= 
<I>p  =  A-lA  o  p 
~(  = 
A-1~ A-l,  o  1L  o  (5) 
7 Therefore, there are n2 more parameters in the structural form than in the 
reduced form and it is  necessary to impose the same number of constraints 
to achieve identification3 •  The usual practice makes the diagonal elements of 
Ao equal to 1 which reduces the number of required constraints to n2 - n = 
n(n -1). Sorne other restrictions come from economic theory considerations 
01' from informational assumptions. 
The initial step for the identification of rnonetary policy in a VAR system 
is to decide between an structural or a semi-automatic approach. 
The semi-automatic approach has the advantage of reducing the discretion 
oí the researcher in the choice of the relevant variables  4.  The innovations 
in the system are usually transíormed into contemporaneously uncorrelated 
shocks  using  the Cholesky  decornposition.  Let's  decompose  the variance-
covariance rnatrix of the innovations é, n.  Given that n is  a real symmetric 
positive definite rnatrix, there exist a unique lower triangular matrix A and a 
unique diagonal rnatrix 2;  with positive elements in the main diagonal, such 
that 
(6) 
where  P  ==  A2;1/2  is  a lower  triangular matrix and  A has  1  's on  the main 
diagonal.  This express  ion is  the Cholesky decomposítíon of rnatrix n.  Given 
that we  assurned that  Et  was  uncorrelated with its own  lagged values  and 
lagged values of Yt  we can construct a new innovation, Uf>  that has the same 
properties. 
(7) 
The elements of  this new  vector,  Ut,  are  uncorrelated with each other, 
which makes them usable fol'  economic interpl'etation, given that 
E(  UtU~)  =  E(2;-1/2  A -1  EtE~A  -12;-1/2) 
3Leeper,  Sims and Zha (1996) consider  that using the condition }:, =  1 the identifi-
cation of VARs reduces the "a priori" identification restrictions of standard simultaneous 
equations models and makes the behavior of these models less dependent on the assump-




is  a diagonal rnatrix.  It is  well known that the order of the variables in 
the Yt  vector is critical because the results tend to change when the order is 
altered. The ordering is based usual1y in assumptions about what inforrnation 
is known when a particular decision about monetary policy is  taken. 
The structural approach uses economic and informational restrictions to 
identify meaningful economic shocks.  These restrictions can  adopt one  01' 
severa.1 of the following skemes: 
•  Zero  restrictions  on  the coefficients  for  the predetermined variables. 
This procedure is not used regularly fol'  identification of VAR systems. 
•  Restl'ictions on  2;u.  The simplest l'estriction would be to assume that 
2;u  is diagonal, which would imply that the shocks have an irnmediate 
economic interpretation. 
•  Restrictions  on  the  rnatrix of  contemporaneous  coefficients,  Ao.  In 
general those restrictions make Ao  lower triangular producing a Wold 
causal chain (see Sims (1980)).  However, this does not have to be the 
case (See, fol' instance, Blanchard and Watson (1986), Bernanke (1986), 
King and Watson  (1993))  and  constraints on.Ao can  be O 01' nonzero 
equa.1ity restrictions without clelivering  a,  lower  triangular matrix. 
•  The constraints for  identification  can  be also  placed on  the long-run 
relationship,  A(l), which is  to say  in the sum of impulse responses5 
This works like a long l'un Wold  causa.1  ordering. 
Usually, a cornbination of these restl'ictions lS  used to identify structural 
VAR systems being the most common the joint constraint ayer the matrix of 
contemporaneous coefficients and a diagonal variance-covariance matrix fol' 
the structural innovations. 
5See  Blanchard and Quah (1989) or King,  Plosser, Stock and Watson (1991). 
9 2.2  The identification of monetary policy. 
One of the  .mo.st interesting issues in monetary economics is the finding of one 
01' several mdlcators of the stance of monetary policy.  The traditional view 
is based on using monetary aggregates as  the proper indicators.  Given that 
only the innovations could be interpreted as policy shocks6  the VAR method-
ology has been used extensively to obtain the innovations that should receive 
the name of monetary policy7.  The use of innovations in a broad monetary 
aggregate to capture monetary policy shocks generates the so called liquidity 
p~zzle. In the stand~rd ~acroe~onomic model an increase in money supply 
W1U lead to  ~ reductlOn  m  the mterest rate in  the short run, if prices and 
outpu.t are stIcky.  H.o~ever, positi~e innovations in the monetary aggregate 
equatlOn have a posltIve effect on  Illterest rates8 •  Besides, it is  well  known 
that. when the VAR specifications contains a broad monetary aggregate and 
the mterest rate money supply fails to Granger-cause output and its explana-
tory power over the variance of output is  largely reduced.  The main theo-
retical reason that explains these effect  is  the endogeneity of broad-money 
measures. (Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)):  the Federal Reserve supplies 
~eserve~ m  ~rder to accommodate demand innovations  which  implies that 
mnovatlOns m monetary aggregates are essentially demand impulses. 
.  To  ~void this identification problem some researchers have proposed the 
mnovatlOns  on a  narrow aggregate,  the nonborrowed reserves,  as  the right 
n:easure of :nonetary policy.  Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)  and Chris-
ttano and Elchenbaum (1995) argue that innovations in nonborrowed reserves 
should be considered as  exogenous policy.  Strogin (1995)  have recentIy sug-
ges~ed t~at the use of the.raw volume of nonbolTowed reserves is not enough 
~o ldentIfy monetary polIcy  disturbances.  He  argues  that, even  though it 
lS  true that the nonbolTowed reserves are more directly controllable by the 
central than borrowed reserves, what matters is the reserves mix.  Therefore 
Strogin (1995) uses innovations on the mix of borrowed and nonbolTowed  re~ 
serves to identify monetary policy innovations that are not the result of the 
6Cochrane (1995) challenges this view  of considering only the unexpected component 
of the money supply as active monetary policy 
7Cochrane  (1995) and Rudenbush  (1996)  p~esent sorne recent  criticims to the use  of 
VARs  to identify monetary policy. 
8A  recent example of this effect  can be found in Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996). 
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accommodation of the Federal Reseve to demand innovations.  Gordon and 
Leeper (1994)  estimate a  demand and supply system for  reserves  and M2. 
Monetary policy  innovations  are identified as  shifts of the reserves  supply 
curve outward when the demand curve is unchanged. 
Finally Bernanke and Blinder (1992)  show that the Federal funds rate is 
superior to monetary aggregates as  a forecaster of the economy and argue 
that movements in the Federal funds  rate are true policy changes.  Prom a 
theoretical viewpoint this is  true when the supply curve for  reserves is  per-
íect1y elastic, which implies that innovations in  the short term interest rate 
can  be identified  as  the stance of  monetary policy.  The empirica1  imp1e-
mentation of this idea generates what is  cal1ed  the price puzzle:  a  positive 
innovation in the Federal funcls  is  associated with an increase in  the price 
1eve19  which  is  at odds  with  the conventional  theory.  Two  solutions have 
been proposed to solve  this puzzle.  Sims  (1992)  argues  that the Fed may 
use  an indicator of infiation in its reaction function
10  and propose the use 
of  commodity pricesll.  Other researchers propose the use of  an structural 
01'  semi-structural approach  insteacl of the semi-automatic approach.  This 
literature is  revised in the next section. 
Bernanke and Mihov (1995), following closely Bernanke and Blinder (1992), 
consider most oí the aboye mentioned approaches as  particular cases of the 
system 
k  k 
Yt  L Bi Y t- I + L CiPt-l + AYvf 
i=O  i=O 
k  k 
PI  =  L Di 1'1-1 + ¿ G¡Pt-l +  APvf  (9) 
i=O  i=O 
where Y is the vector of nonpolicy variables, P is the policy variables and 
the second equation can be interpreted as  the policy reaction function.  The 
9Gordon and Leeper  (1992),  Eichenbaum (1992), Sims (1992)  and Leeper,  Sims and 
Zha  (1996).  Christiano (1992)  and Christiano,  Eichanbaum and Evans  (1996) find  the 
same price puzzle usíng the nonborrowed reserves  as  the monetary policy indicator. 
¡OIn terms of the informational explanation of the ordering of the VAR the equation for 
the monetary indicator should inc1ude an indicator of ínflation. 
11 Christ,iano , Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) use the same argument and indicator. 
11 structural error terms, vY and vP,  are supposed to be uncorrelated.  An ad-
ditional condition to obtain identification is  the assumption that the macro 
variables are not affected by the policy shocks in the same period, 01' Co =  O. 
Transforming the system it is  possible to derive a relationship between the 
structural error terms and the reduced form errors  that allows  the imposi-
tion of alternative identification assumptions on  the demand and supply of 
reserves and ot4er monetary aggregates12 
3  Identification of monetary policy in open 
economies. 
There has been a lot of recent attention on  the issues of the effects of mon-
etary policy on  exchange rates and the analysis of monetary policy on Ger-
many.  One of our objectives is to put together these two issues in the analysis 
of the transmission of monetary policy in the EMS. 
The analysis of the effects of monetary policy on exchange rates delivers 
frequently what is  caBed the exchange rate puzzle:  a positive innovation in 
the interest rate is  associated with the depreciation of a currency instead of 
the appreciation  13. 
Curiously, this puzzle does  not exist for  the USo  Eichenbaum and Evans 
(1995)  reports the effects  of  the US  monetary policy  shocks  on  the dollar 
exchange rate with  respect  to  currencies  of  other industrialized countries. 
They use  the semi-automatic VAR approach which  puts the US  monetary 
policy tools  before the exchange rate in  the recursive ordering.  They find 
that there is  no  exchange rate puzzle for  the US:  the US  dollarss  appreci-
ate in response to a tight money shock in the US,  as  is  normally expected. 
This  contrast between the US  and  those for  other countries is  suggestive. 
A possible interpretation is  that the exchange rate puzzle occurs when  the 
12Leeper,  Sims and Zha (1996) argue that the economic interpretation in Bernanke and 
Mihov (1995) involves constrains not imposed by  the other researchers mentioned in this 
section. 
13Grilli and Roubini (1994) study the effects of mOlletary policy of severa] industrialized 
countries (other than US)  on  their exchange rates and report this kind of puzzle. 
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monetary authority responds  endogenously  to innovations in the exchange 
rate within one periodo  For example, if the central bank tightens its mone-
tary policy stance as  soon as it sees a depreciation of its currency, and if the 
econometricians put the monetary policy tools before the exchange rate in 
the recursive ordering, to the eyes of those econometricians it would look as 
if the tight monetary policy caused the depreciation.  This puzzle does not 
occur in the case of the US, presumable because the Fed is insensitive to the 
exchange rate movements at least in the short run, and therefore it acts as 
a "leader" in its relationship with the central banks of other countries.  This 
interpretation was put forth by Gri1li and Roubini (1994). 
If the aboye interpretation is  correct, we  may be able to resolve the ex-
change rate puzzle by explicitly model1ing a possible simultaneous determina-
tion of the monetary policy tools and the exchange rateo  This line of research 
was  fol1owed  by Kim and Roubini (1996), who proposed an strudural VAR 
approach to identify monetary policy shocks where, at least initially, the ef-
fect of a contractionary monetary policy is  an appreciation of the exchange 
rateo  Cushman  and  Zha  (1995)  highlight  the role  of exchange rates as  a 
transmission mechanism. 
Another important finding  from  the paper by  Eichenbaum and Evans 
was  the presence of the "forward premium puzzle".  A positive shock to the 
US  interest rate typically means a widening of the interest rate differential 
between the US  and other countries.  The formula of the uncovered interest 
rate parity suggests  that, when  the US  interest rate is  higher  than a for-
eign interest rate, the US  dollars should be depreciating over time.  In other 
words,  the initial impact of an increase in the US interest rate should cause 
an appreciation of the US  dollars, but then the US  dollars should start de-
precia.ting immediately.  Eichenbaum and Evans found  that it was  not the 
case in their estimation results.  The US  dollars keep  appreciating for a few 
moths in response their identified tight money shocks, instead of peaking at 
the time of the shock. 
On the other hand some recent papers have used the VAR methodology 
to analyze German monetary policy.  Clarida and  Gertler (1996)  show how 
German monetary policy, despite the public focus on monetary targeting, has 
involved the managemerit of short term interest rates.  Bernanke and Mihov 
13 (1996), using the methodology proposed in Bernanke and Mihov (1995), find 
the same result and emphasize that even though the Lombard rate has been 
in the past a  good indicator for  monetary policy  the use  of the can rate 
cannot be rejected statistically as  an  indicator. 
4  Cross Country. Analysis of Policy Trans-
mission 
4.1  Framework 
In this section, we  analyze transmission of German monetary policy shocks 
to other European countries by means of a cross  country analysis.  Degrees 
of commitment to the exchange rate system varied substantial1y across coun-
tries.  For example, France, Belgium and the Netherlands can be considered 
as  core member countries, in that their degree of commitment to keep their 
exchange rates within the bancls has been consistently high ayer the periods. 
ltaly and Spain can be considerecl semi periphery countries.  ltaly underwent 
frequent clevaluation of its currency and moved out of the system temporar-
ily.  Spain joined the system much later than most of the member countries. 
The UK  can  be considered a periphery country  as  its commitment to the 
exchange rate stabilization has been practical1y inexistent. 
We will try to take advantage of this cross country variation to uncover 
effects of joining the system on  the movement of the interest rate and the 
stability of the exchange rate for the member countries.  For that purpose, we 
estimate the same VAR model for  each country separately and compare the 
effects of the German policy indicator on  the interest rate and the exchange 
rate of those member countries.  Specifically, our VARs in  elude 5 variables: 
an indicator of 'German monetary policy, the index of industrial production 
of the local country (Y), CPI of the local country (P), the short term interest 
rate of the local country (R), and the exchange rate against the DM  (EX). 
The last variable measures the unit value of the DM  measured in the local 
currency so  an in  crease in this  variable means  a  depreciation of the local 
currency.  Detailed definitions and sources of the data can be found in Ap-
pendix B.  The data is  monthly.  The sample period starts in January 1980 
and ends in May 1995 for  Spain, December 1994 for  Italy, October 1995 for 
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Belgium and December 1995 for the resto  The selection of the end period was 
dictated by the data availability.  The number of lags to include in the VAR 
system was set to one.  We use the Cholesky decomposition to orthogonalize 
the shocks.  The variables were ordered as:  the German policy variable - Y-
P-R-EX. That is, German monetary policy is supposed to bé predetermined 
for the local economy in the short run:  the German monetary authority does 
not respond contemporaneously neither to the local monetary policy (repre-
sented by R) nor to EX.  The local monetary policy is  also supposed not to 
respond to EX within a periodo 
This two  steps procedure implies  that, for  instance, German  monetary 
policy do es not react to changes in French monetary policy caused by changes 
in German policy.  This is  an  strong assumption but is  consistent with the 
comments in the beggining of the article. If  Germany has to be the leader of a 
group of countries that get as the main advantage of the European Monetary 
System 01', in the future, the Monetary Union, the transmission of credibility 
from  the German central bank then  German monetary authorities should 
only look to their internal conditions and the other countries should react to 
German monetary policy without the possibility of having any effect on it. 
Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) present a methodology that would allow t?e 
estimation of a VAR system with variables from Germany and other countnes 
and endogeneity between German monetary policy and other countries' mon-
etary policy.  However, the size of the system would  be very large.  Besides, 
Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996)  do  not specify the operating procedure of the 
central bank.  More important, as  we  pointed out before, the identification 
squeme followed in this papel' is consisten with the theory of credibility trans-
mission.  This fact  avoids  the use of the nonrecursive identification pattern 
in the eighteen variable model proposed by the ahoye mentioned papel'. 
4.2  Case 1:  Estimation with the German interest rate 
As  an  indicator of the German  monetary policy  stance,  we  first  consider 
the German short term interest rateo  Figure 1 shows responses of the local 
interest rates to one standard deviation shocks to the German interest rateo 
In the panel at the top, we show point estimates of the responses for the six 
countries together, for  the sake of  cross  country comparison.  In  the lower 
15 Figure 1:  Responses of R to German Interest Rate Shock 
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six panels we show responses for each country separately, together with their 
error bands.  In those diagrams, as well as in all the other diagrams of similar 
nature in this section, the lines in the middIe are the point estimates, the two 
lines closer to the point estimates are the one standard error bands, and the 
two lines furthest outside are the two standard error bands.  As Sims and Zha 
(1995)  argued, in the VARs, standard errors around point estimates tend to 
be large as  we  do not impose strong a priori restrictions on the model, and 
therefore the use of the conventional two standard erro)' bands seems to be 
too strict. For that reason, we shall use the one standard error bands as the 
main reference point. 
Results in Figure 1 fit very well with our prior expectation.  The interest 
rate of  the core countries,  that is,  Belgium,  the Netherlands  and France, 
respond very strongly to the German monetary policy shock, presumabIy to 
keep  the exchange rate against  the DM within the permitted bands.  The 
effects are significant for  most of the periods after the shock.  On the other 
hand, the responses are very smaU for the semi periphel'Y countries.  For Italy, 
the response  turns significant  only  after 6 months  and turns  insignificant 
again in 11  months.  For  Spain,  the response is  never significantly positive 
and is  even significantly negative initial1y.  For  the periphery country, UK, 
the response is  never significantly positive,  and it even  turns significantly 
negative after 23  months. 
Table 1 presents contribution of  the German interest rate shock to the 
variance of  R  for  each  country.  Consistently  with  the impulse responses 
in Figure 1,  the contribution is  larger for  the core countries, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and France, and smaller for  the others. 
Table  1:  Contribution of the German interest rate shock 
to the variance of R (percentage) 
Spain  ltaly  Belgium  DK  the Netherlands  France 
1 mOllth  0.81  0.29  0.35  0.02  9.82  2.19 
6 months  0.60  0.40  15.95  0.10  45.57  12.66 
24 months  0.55  1.86  45.10  1.41  47.90  40.43 
Figure 2 shows  responses  of the exchange rate, EX, to  a  one standard 
deviation German interest rate shock.  This time, the responses do not seem 
l7 to make too much sense.  As  was  discussed in the previous section, theory 
(Grilli and Roubini (1994), for  example), predicts that a tight money shock 
in Germany should  be followed  by an  immediate depreciation of the local 
currency against the DM  (an increase in EX). In the figure, however, in five 
out of six  cases  the initial response  is  negative,  not  positive.  For Spain, 
Italy and Belgium the effects are significant initially.  For France the initial 
effect  is  negative but insignificant.  In  the case of Spain the perverse effect 
is  particularly strong and significant.  Only in  the case of the Netherlands 
we find  the expected positive (and significant) response.  In other words, by 
using the German interest rate as an indicator of its policy we encounter the 
problem of the "exchange  rate puzzle"  (refer to Grilli and Roubini (1994)). 
Table  2  shows  contribution  of  the  German  interest  rate shock  to  the 
variance of  EX  for  each  country.  The effects  are  large for  Spain  (in  the 
"wrong"  direction) and for  the Netherlands  (in  the "right"  direction).  For 
Italy the effect turns large (in the "right" clirection) but only in the long run, 
contrary to theory. 
Table  2:  Contribution of the German interest rate shock 
to the variance of EX (percentage) 
Spain  Italy  Belgium  UI\:  the Netherlands  France 
1 month  6.31  1.32  0.59  0.11  4.35  0.41 
6 months  8.34  0.62  0.12  0.06  5.49  0.68 
24  months  5.79  5.28  0.66  0.26  7.66  0.82 
Figure 2 suggests  that the short  tel'm interest rate may not  be an  ap-
propriate indicator for  the German  monetary policy.  A possible  cause oí 
the exchange  rate puzzle  that is  írequently mentioned  in  the literature is 
endogenous response of the monetary authority to  shocks  to the exchange 
rate market. If the authority responds to those shocks within a period, the 
interest rate will reflect not only exogenous policy changes but also endoge-
nous response to those shocks.  In our case, if the German authority responds 
within a month to a shock  that lowers  the value of the DM by raising the 
interest rate, and if  the econornetric moclel fails to capture the information on 
this shock, to the eyes of the econometricians it would look as if the increase 
in the Gerrnan interest rate causecl  the depreciation of the DM. 
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Figure 2:  Responses of EX to German Interest Rate Shock 
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19 There are other reasons to believe that the German interest rate is a con-
taminated indicator of monetary policy.  In Appendix A, we estimate a VAR 
model for Germany which includes seven variables used in the study of Kim 
and Roubini (1996)  but using  the Cholesky decomposition instead oí their 
structura.l VAR model to orthogonalize the shocks.  The seven variables are: 
oil  prices,  the US  federal  funds  rate,  CPI, the index of industrial produc-
tion, the interest rate, money supply and the exchange rate between the US 
dollarss  and the DM.  It is shown that the use of the interest rate shock as 
an indicator oí exogenous policy changes not only causes the exchange rate 
puzzle but also causes the "price puzzle":  the German price level decreases 
instead of increases in response to an  in crease in the German interest rateo 
In Appendix A, we propose to solve those problems by estimating a struc-
tural VAR model that is  similar to that of Kim and Roubini  (1996)  which 
takes into account endogenous response of the German monetary authority to 
the exchange rate market shocks within one month.  Responses to the mone-
tary policy shocks thus estimated are a11  reasonable:  the price level, output 
and money supply of Germany decrease in response to a tight money shock, 
while the German interest rate goes  up  and the DM  appreciates.  We  con-
sider this estimated policy shock as  a more reliable indicator of autonomous 
changes in German monetary policy than the interest rate itself. In the next 
subsection we use tbis shock series instead of the German interest rate as an 
indicator of German monetary policy and redo the cross country analysis oí 
the previous subsection. 
4.3  Case 2:  Estimation using the identified shocks 
In this subsection we present results from VARs using the identified German 
monetary policy shocks from  the strudural VAR model in the Appendix as 
an indicator of autonomous changes in German monetary policy.  An in crease 
in this series means a tightening of the German mo'uetary policy stance.  The 
order of orthogonalization  is  again  the German monetary policy  shocks  -
Y-P-R-EX. This ordering amounts to assuming that the German monetary 
authority does not respond to innovations in  R nor EX contemporaneously. 
That is,  within Europe, Germany acts as  a "leader"  (using the terminology 
of  Grilli  and Roubini  (1994)).  On  tbe other hand,  the German monetary 
policy shock series was  derived f1'om a model in whicb the German monetary 
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authority was  assumed to respond to innovations in the US  Federal Funds 
Rate and the exchange rate between the US  do11arss  and the DM contempo-
raneously (reíer to Appendix for  details).  Thus, in the relationship with the 
US, we are assuming that Germany acts as a "follower".  We  consider those 
assumptions as íairly realistic. 
Oí course, the German monetary policy shocks are drawn from the esti-
mation oí the structural VAR, and therefore are estimates that have standard 
errors around them. However, to facilitate the comparison between this Case 
2 with Case 1,  and to save the estimation time, we treat them as if they were 
precisely measured  data.  We  intend to take into account the uncertainty 
around this estimated series in  OUl'  future work. 
Figure 3 shows responses of the local interest rates to a one standard error 
German monetary policy shock.  Note that the scales are the same as those in 
Figure 1.  In most cases the responses change drastica11y from those in Figure 
1.  We could divide the six countries into three groups.  The first group shows 
the expected positive responses of R to the German tight money shock, and 
includes Spain, Belgium, the Nethel'lands and France.  The second category 
includes onJy Italy, which shows  the expected positive response in the short 
run but an  unexpected strong negative response in the long runo  The third 
group consists of UK aJone, which shows  a "wrong", negative response. 
It is worth noting that the first gl'OUp  of countries, which show the "cor-
rect" responses, includes a11  the "core" countries of the system, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and France.  The response is particularly strong for  France. The 
response oí the Dutch R is significant for only one month.  The responses of 
the Belgian and the Spanish R are never significant. 
The response of the Italian R  is  somewhat puzzling.  One  possible ex-
planation is  that it reflects  tbe behavioral pattern of tbe ltalian monetary 
autbority: in the face of a tigbt money sbock in Germany tbe authority raises 
the interest rate at the beginning to keep the exchange rate within the per-
mitted bands, but later reverses the course of action after facing protests and 
pressures írom tbe public and politicians in response to deflationary effects 
of tbe initial policy change. 
Tbe fact tbat the response of tbe British R is negative itself is counterin-
tuitive, but, on tbe other hand, the fact that its response is lower tban those 
21 Figure 3:  Responses of R to Identified German Monetary Policy Shock 
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for  other countries (except for  Italy in the long  run) makes  sense.  As  UK 
was  never committed to keeping the exchange rate within the bands, it did 
not find it necessary to respond to  a  tight money shock from  Germany by 
tightening the monetary policy stance, unlike the other countries. 
Table 3 presents contribution of the German monetary policy shock  to 
the variance of R for  each country.  It lS  generally very small, less than two 
percent with the exceptl0n of France, Holland in the short run and ltaly in 
the medium to long runo 
Table  3:  Contribution of the Identified German policy shock 
to the variance of R (pereentage) 
Spain  ltaly  Belgium  DE:  the Netherlands  Franee 
1 month  0.56  0.92  0.06  0.23  3.45  4.90 
6 months  0.34  4.64  0.72  1.13  1.38  8.44 
24 months  0.31  5.07  0.70  1.26  1.20  7.94 
Figure 4 presents responses of EX to a one standard deviation German 
monetary policy shock.  Note that the  exchange  rate  puzzle  has  completely 
dísappeared by switching the indieator of German rnonetary policy.  All  the 
responses  are  either positive  01'  praetieally zero  for  all  the  periods.  This 
supports the superiority of the estirnated shocks  to the interest rate as  an 
indicator of German rnonetary poliey.  Also,  the  relative size  01 the responses 
across the countries Jits  ou~' prior beliel peljectly.  UK, whieh has had the least 
eornmitrnent to the EMS shows the largest response.  ltaly and Spain, whieh 
have been a bit more loyal to the systern, show srnaller (at least in the short 
run) but stilllarge responses.  The"  core"  eountries of the systern, Belgiurn, 
the Netherlands  and Franee,  are  ehara.cterized  by rnueh  smaller responses 
than the "periphery"  and the "semi-periphery"  eountries.  The response is 
partieularly srnall for  the Netherlands. 
The relative size of the responses from Figure 4 is  not exactly inversely 
related to the relative size of the responses from Figure 3.  We  do,  however, 
find  a pattern that the periphery country which is  least cornrnitted to the 
exchange rate system shows the lowest response of R and the largest response 
of EX, and that the core countries exhibit a high  sensitivity of R to Gerrnan 
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monetary policy shocks and their EX responds relatively weakly.  Italy, one 
of the semi periphery countries, is charaderized by a perverse response of R 
and a strong (though weaker than VI<) response of EX. A major exception to 
this pattern is Spain, whose R responds strongly (though insignificantly) to a 
German monetary policy shock (which is contrary to our prior expectation), 
and, despite that, its EX responds relatively strongly to the shock.  This may 
be because Spain underwent a major structural change when it entered the 
EMS. If  so, putting periods both before and after the entrance to the system 
together may lead to a misspecification and therefore wrong estimates  . 
Table 4 presents contribution of the German monetary policy shock to 
the variance of EX for  each country.  The only difference from  the impulse 
response analysis is that the contribution to the Spanish EX turns out to be 
fairly small. 
Table  4:  Contribution of the Identified German policy shock 
to the variance of EX (percentage) 
Spain  ltaly  Belgium  VK  the Netherlands  France 
1 month  1.34  0.87  1.17  6.22  3.31  1.51 
6 months  3.89  6.46  2.59  13.25  1.58  5.54 
24  months  2.50  9.85  3.02  14.21  1.19  6.74 
Therefore our results are broadly consistent with our prior belief.  When 
the German monetary authority tightens its policy stance, the core countries 
of the system respond strongly by raising the interest rateo  Because of that, 
those countries experience relatively small changes in the exchange rate, and 
thus are able to keep it within the permitted bands.  More peripheral coun-
tries respond less  strongly  to the German monetary policy tightening.  As 
a result, their exchange rates respond  more strongly.  In  short, joining the 
EMS  (and taking it seriously)  contri bu  tes to stabilizing the exchange rate, , 
while imposing more constraints on the conduct of monetary policy. 
Our remaining problem is  the "Spain puzzle".  Estimated results using 
the whole sample from 1980  to 1995  are not necessarily consistent with our 
prior beliefs.  This may be because Spain joined the EMS in the middle of the 
sample, July 1989, and thus thel'e is  an important structural break around 
25 that periodo  In the next section we  pursue this possibility by  splitting the 
sample into the pre-joining EMS  period and the post-EMS joining periodo 
In fact  this analysis offers  another interesting opportunity to studying the 
conseq~ences of the EMS. We could ask, for example: did the Spanish interest 
rate become more responsive to the German monetary policy shocks, as one 
would expect?  Did the Spanish exchange rate against the DM become les s 
responsive to the German monetary policy shocks? 
In order to answer these questions, we redo the analysis we performed in 
the previous section for Spain, but splitting the sample in two periods:  before 
July 1989 and after July 1989.  We first used the German interest rate as  an 
indicator of the German monetary policy stance, but the results suffered from 
the same kind of  anomalies as  we  found  in  the previous section for  Spain. 
Therefore,  we  report  only  the case  where  we  used  the identified  German 
monetary policy shocks from the structural VAR as  a policy indicator. 
Once again, the number of lags is set to one, and the seasonal dummies are 
included.  The pre-EMS period is from  January 1980  to June 1989,  and the 
EMS period is from July 1989 to October 1995.  Figure 5 reports the responses 
to a one standard deviation shock to German monetary policy of R and EX. 
Note that the scales are the same as  the previous graphs.  Predictably, due 
to  the short  sample periods,  the error  bands  around  the point  estimates 
are huge.  Nevertheless, we  learn  the following.  There is  no  evidence that 
responsiveness of R increased after Spain joined the system. If anything, the 
point estimates are higher at the impact in the pre-EMS periodo  However, the 
standard errors are so large that, the right conclusion one should draw is that 
we do not know precisely what happened to the responsiveness of R.  On the 
other hand, the response of EX is significantly positive in the pre-EMS period 
but turn significant  after joining the EMS.  This is  what one would expect: 
When Spain is outside the system, the Bank of Spain did not try to stabilize 
the exchange rate, so  it fluctuates in response' to  German monetary policy 
shocks.  But after joining the system the exchange rate becomes insensitive 
to German monetary policy shocks as the Bank of Spain tries to maintain the 
exchange rateo  The reason that this effect does not show up in the responses 
of R  may be because the Bank of Spain used tools other than the standard 
monetary policy to stabi1ize the exchange rate.  One candidate of such a tool 
is  the capital control, which was  frec¡uently  imposed during this periodo  A 
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further study is  needed to investigate this possibility. 
Table 5 reports the results of variance decomposition.  This confirms the 
impression from Figure 5.  The only sizable effect  exists for  EX in the pre-
EMS  periodo  We  found  that the contribution peaks in  the fifth  month at 
11.47%.  After Spain joined the EMS, this contribution goes  down to almost 
nothing.  The result confirms the idea that joining the EMS tends to insulate 
the exchange rate from fluctuations in the German monetary policy stance. 
Table 5:  Contribution of Identified German Monetary Policy Shocks. 
to R and EX: Spain (%) 
R, pre-EMS  R,EMS  EX, pre-EMS  EX, EMS 
1 month  0.61  0.09  5.02  0.13 
24 months  0.68  2.40  8.90  0.61 
5  Conclusions 
Our results  are fairly  consistent with  the standard view  on  the European 
Monetary System. We have shown in the cross country analysis that joining 
the EMS  and sticking to its rule means giving up at least sorne part of the 
independence of monetary policy, as  the interest rate has to be responding to 
monetary policy shocks from  Germany.  On the other hand, those countries 
tend to achieve more exchange rate stahility in that the exchange rate tends 
to be insulated from shocks to German monetary policy.  In  the cross-period 
analysis  for  Spain it was  shown  that,  after joining the EMS,  the Spanish 
exchange rate has become much less responsive to German monetary policy 
shocks while the interest rate is more responsive. 
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28 A.2  Evidence from a  Standard VAR Analysis 
We first estimated a standard VAR model which assumes a recursive ordering 
of OP-FFR-P-Y-R-M-EXDD. Figure A-1  presents impulse responses to one 
standard deviation shock to R, together with error bands (derived from the 
Bayesian Monte CarIo Integration with 1,000 draws) that eorrespond to one 
and two  standar.d error bands, respeetively.  Two  things are worth noting. 
First, in response to an in  crease in R, whieh presumably represents a tight 
money shock,  the price level,  P,  inereases,  not  deereases,  as  suggested by 
most standard theories (the  price puzzle).  Seeondly, the exehange rate shows 
a positive response, that is, it depreciates, eontrary to what is  suggested by 
the theory oí Grilli  and Roubini  (1994)  etc (the  exchange  rate  puzzle).  In 
addition, Y initial1y incl'eases  (though the effect  is  signifieant fol'  only  one 
month)  before it starts  to  deerease  in  the medium run,  and M  de creases 
signifieantly fol'  only  one  month.  Those  observations,  espeeially  the first 
two,  led us  to eonclude that the interest l'ate itself was  a  pOOl'  indicator of 
autonomous ehanges in  monetary policy. 
A.3  Structural VAR model 
We estimate a struetural VAR model close to that in Kim and Roubini.  The 
short run restrictions are summarized in  the following  tableo  "*,,  means a 
free parameter.  A blank means a zero restrietion. 
Table A-1:  Short run restrictions 
in the struetural VAR model 
Eq.\Var.  OP  FFR  P  Y  R  M 
OP  1 
FFR  *  1 
P  *  1 
Y  *  *  1 
MS  *  *  1  * 
MD  *  *  *  1 






The model is  overidentified (two extra restridions).  (MS)  is  the money 
supply equation.  P  and  Y  are  excluded beeause  the central bank obtains 
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Figure A-1: Reponses to German Interest Rate Shock (standard VAR) 
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31 information on those variables with lags.  The central bank is assumed to re-
spond to EXDD within a month.  (MD) is the usual money demand function. 
(MKT) is the exchange market equation and it includes all the variables.  As 
the exchange rate is a forward looking variable, it reflects all the iníormation 
available to the market.  A major difference between this model and that oí 
Kim and Roubini is that both P and Y are assumed to depend on EXDD. In 
that sense, our mo~el is slightly more general than that of Kim and Roubini. 
AA  Estimating the structural VAR model 
We first estimated the model without any further restriction, but the results 
were  anomalous in  two  ways.  First, the estimated coefficient on  EXDD in 
the (MS) equation meant that the Bundesbank lowers the interest rate when 
it observes a depreciation of the DM  (an increase in EXDD). Secondly, the 
estimated coefficient on R in the (MKT) equation meant that the exchange 
rate depreciates when  the interest rate increases.  We  normally expect the 
both of those relationships to be the other way  round.  To  avoid this prob-
lem, we imposed two  additional inequality constraints:  R can respond only 
positively to EXDD in the (MS) equation, and EXDD can respond only neg-
atively to R in  the (MKT) equation.  After imposing those two  restrictions, 
the anomalies disappeal'ed.  The resulting estimates are the following. 
UOP  O  O  O  O  O  O  O 










0.05**  O  O  O  O  O  0.02** 
=  0.18*  O  -0.50  O  O  O  0.02 
0.04  -0.1  O  O  O  0.35  0.12 
O  O  -0.12  0.03  -0.58  O  O 
-0.11  1.15**  -0.71  0.15  -3.18  2.28  O 
+  (eop  eFFR  ep  el'  eMS  eMD  ell1I<T)' 
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"*,, means that the point estimate is  more than one standard error away 
from zero.  "**,,  means that the point estimate is  more than two standard 
error  s  away  from  zero.  significantIy  different  from  zero  at the 5%  level.. 
The overidentiíying restrictions were not rejected.  The p-value was  98.4%. 
Unfortunately, most of the estimates have large standard error  s around them. 
This is part1y because the model is highly complicated in that five variables 
are simultaneously determined.  In that sense, it is  the price we pay for  the 
generality of the model.  Standard deviations for  the structural shocks are: 
eop: 0.0062,  eFFR: 0.0061, ep: 0.0014,  ey:  0.0149,  eMS: 0.0042, eMD: 0.0038, 
and eMI<T:  0.0261. 
A.5  Impulse responses 
Figure A-2  shows  responses  to one  standard deviation shock  to the (MS) 
equation (a contractionary monetary policy shock).  Error bands are calcu-
lated following the method of Sims and Zha (1994)  and are based on 10,000 
draws (their method requires taking substantially more draws to get reliable 
outcomes than the method usable fol'  the standard VAR).  Note that  both 
the price puzzle and the  exchange  rate puzzle disappeared from  the estimates. 
AIso, note that the trough of the response of EXDD comes very quickly.  AI-
though we had not had time to test it formally, this model does  not seem to 
suffer from the "forward premium puzzle" of Eichenbaum and Evans (199?). 
Moreover, M responds much more strongly negatively in  this figure than in 
the standard VAR case,  and the effect  lasts longer.  For  those  reasons,  we 
consider this estimated (MS) shock as  a much more reliable indicator oí au-
tonomous changes in  German monetary policy than the interellt rate itself. 
A major remaining problem is  that the response of Y is  still positive in the 
short runo 
33 Figure A-2:  Reponses to German Monetary Policy Shock (structural VAR) 
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A.6  Variance decomposition 
Table A-2 presents results of the decomposition of the within month forecast 
variance. 
Table A-2:  Variance decomposition: 
for the within 1 month forecast variance (%) 
Var.Shock  OP  FFR  P  Y  MS  MD  MKT 
OP  100  O  O  O  O  O  O 
FFR  O  100  O  O  O  O  O 
P  3  1  90  O  2  O  4 
Y  O  O  O  99  O  O  O 
R  O  O  O  1  54  17  28 
M  O  O  O  O  16  74  9 
EXDD  O  8  O  1  24  1  66 
Note that the MS shocks have large effects on  all of R, M and EX even in 
the short runo  On the other hand, innova.tions in R have a large component of 
shocks to the money demand and shocks to the exchange rate market. This 
justifies our speculation that the interest rate is a contaminated indicator of 
the German monetary policy stance. 
Table A-3  presents results for  the 24  months ahead forecast. variance. 
Table A-3:  Variance decomposition: 
for the 24  months ahead forecast val'iance (%) 
Var.Shock  OP  FFR  P  Y  MS  MD  MKT 
OP  74  9  10  4  1  O  3 
FFR  14  49  13  6  4  1  11 
p  40  14  11  1  1  13  21 
Y  2  6  2  84  2  2  1 
R  19  25  8  21  7  6  14 
M  22  12  3  8  2  49  3 
EXDD  10  5  6  9  12  3  56 
The effects of the monetary policy shock are modest at best in the long 
runo  Only its contl'ibution  to  the variance of  EXDD exceeds  10%.  Most 
importantly, monetary policy is definitely an unimportant source of val'iation 
fol'  P  and Y. 
35 B  Data Source 
Most  of  the data re from  International Financial Statistics  (IFS) of  IMF. 
To  calculate the exchange rate (the variable EX  in the text) between Ger-
many and other member countries, we divided the exchange rate of the latter 
against the US$  by that of Germany against the US$. 
Germany: 
Index of Industrial Production:  IFS, 134 66C 
CPI: IFS, 134,  64 
the interest rate: IFS, 134  60B  (cal1 money rate) 
the exchange rate (against US$):  IFS, 134 RF 
Money Supply:  IFS,  134  38  NBC  (M3,  National Definition, sea-
sonally adjusted) 
Spain: 
Index of Industrial Production:  IFS, 184 66C 
CPI: IFS, 184, 64 
the interest rate:  the day-to-day  interbank money market rate, 
Monthly BuHetin of Statistics, Bank of Spain 
the exchange ra.te  (against US$):  IFS, 184  RF 
Italy: 
Index of Industrial Production:  IFS, 136  66C 
CPI: IFS, 136,  64 
the interest rate: IFS, 136  60B  (can money rate) 
the exchange rate (against US$):  IFS, 136  RF 
Belgium: 
Index of Industrial Production:  IFS, 132 66B 
CPI: IFS, 132,  64 
the interest rate: IFS, 132  60B  (can money rate) 
36 
the exchange rate (against US$):  IFS, 132 RF 
U!(: 
Index of Industrial Production:  IFS, 112  66C 
CPI: IFS, 112,  64 
the interest rate: Eurostat 269313042  (day-to-day money rate) 
the exchange rate (against US$):  IFS, 112  RF 
the Netherlands: 
Index of Industrial Production:  IFS, 138  66C 
CPI: IFS, 138, 64 
the interest rate: IFS, 138  60B  (caH money rate) 
the exchange rate (against US$):  IFS, 138  RF 
France: 
Index of Industrial Production:  IFS, 124 66C 
CPI: IFS, 124, 64 
the interest rate: Eurostat 149313042 (day-to-day money rate) 
the exchange rate (against US$):  IFS, 124 RF 
Others (for Appendix A): 
Oil Prices:  IFS, 001  76AAZ  (Spot  US$ per Barrel, World) 
Federal Funds Rate, US:  IFS, 111  60B 
Note on  the money supply data for  Germany:  As  discussed in Appendix 
A,  there were  two important definitional  changes  in  the sample period, in 
December 1985 and January 1991.  We take out their effects by using dummy 
variables.  Also, the series shows a suspicious drop in January 1986 (the value 
was  919.10)  and then goes  back to  a seemingly normal value.  We  studied 
similar series, such as  broader M3  in  IFS and M3  in the German data set, 
and never found a similar one time drop.  For this reason we concluded that 
this drop was  due to a typing error.  Using the growth rate of broader M3 in 
IFS, we estimated the correct value of M3 for  this month to be 949.69. 
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